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Abstract 
Vulnerability identification, remediation, and compliance verification within the Department of 
Defense (DOD) are currently inconsistent and non-integrated.  The Secure Configuration Tool 
Suite (SCTS) solution should make significant grounds in resolving the DOD deficiency within 
an Enterprise-wide Information Assurance Vulnerability Management System. 
The professional project documented in this paper is a result of a major DOD initiative in support 
of the SCTS, and is comprised of 2 initiatives: the Secure Configuration Compliance Validation 
Initiative (SCCVI), which provides vulnerability assessment capability, and the Secure
Configuration Remediation Initiative (SCRI), which provides vulnerability remediation 
capability.  As a member of the project installation team the author performed on-site 
installations as required and directed. 
The DOD is a large organization and documenting the entire project would be beyond the scope 
of this professional project. Therefore, this analysis is based on a smaller scale of the initiative 
above. The installation of an unclassified baseline model at a pre-selected DOD command and
all of its subcomponents will be utilized for this thesis. This installation will eventually be 
available for all DOD components to use as a lessons-learned tool and as a result these tools will 
be applied across the DOD Enterprise and should fully integrate IA Vulnerability identification, 
verification, and reporting; thus making a significant contribution to an Enterprise-wide
Information Assurance Vulnerability Management System. 
While this project is based on actual events and efforts, in order to keep within the guidelines of
non-disclosure outside of the DOD environment, specific names of commands, agencies and 
locations have been substituted with generic ones.
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Executive Summary 
Vulnerability identification, remediation, and compliance verification within Department of 
Defense (DOD) are currently inconsistent and non-integrated.  The requirement to resolve this 
deficiency was identified by the DOD Enterprise-wide Information Assurance and Computer 
Network Defense (IA/CND) Solutions Steering Group (ESSG) chaired by a major strategic 
command.  My agency, at the request of this command and in support of National Security goals, 
purchased from industry; a capability that will assist in the development and deployment of an 
automated tool that will provide network administrators and security personnel a mechanism for 
the remediation of vulnerabilities based on DOD instructions.  This tool suite, consisting of the 
Secure Configuration Compliance Validation Initiative (SCCVI) tool and the Secure
Configuration Remediation Initiative (SCRI) tool, will be the “Enterprise-wide” solution known 
as the Secure Configuration Tool Suite (SCTS) across the DOD (Combatant Commands, 
Intelligence Community (non-Title 50 elements), Services, and DOD Agencies), Coast Guard, 
National Guard, and the Reserves, hereafter referred to as the “Enterprise.”  This project covers 
the installation of these tools at a major Combatant Command and its Sub-Components in an 
effort to establish a baseline and concept of operations for all subsequent installations to follow.   
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Chapter One 
Introduction 
In addition to the traditional Information Assurance (IA) capabilities provided by my employer, 
we are also supporting a major Department of Defense (DOD) Combatant Command’s initiative 
developed and approved by the Enterprise Solutions Steering Group (ESSG) of my organization 
by providing DOD level enterprise-wide solutions for IA.   
My employer is the deploying arm for these efforts and we will provide installation support for 
the Secure Configuration Tool Suite (SCTS) Initiative.  SCTS is the DOD enterprise-wide 
solution for vulnerability assessment and vulnerability remediation and is comprised of two 
initiatives.   
The Secure Configuration Compliance Validation Initiative (SCCVI) provides vulnerability 
assessment capability and the Secure Configuration Remediation Initiative (SCRI) provides 
vulnerability remediation capability.  These products were purchased from Citadel Security 
Software, Inc. and eEye Digital Security. 
These tools will be applied Enterprise-wide across the DOD, Coast Guard, National Guard, and 
the Reserves.  This capability should fully integrate IA Vulnerability identification, verification, 
and reporting. 
This project is an effort to install the SCTS at a major combatant command to be utilized as the 
baseline for future installations at other DOD components. 
IA Enterprise Tools Overview 
The Secure Configuration Tool Suite (SCTS) is a DOD enterprise-wide solution for vulnerability 
assessment and vulnerability remediation and is comprised of two initiatives.  These initiatives 
are the Secure Configuration Compliance Validation Initiative (SCCVI), which provides 
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vulnerability assessment capability, and the Secure Configuration Remediation Initiative (SCRI) 
that provides vulnerability remediation capability.  Below is an overview of the SCCVI and 
SCRI initiatives and the capabilities of each tool.
Secure Configuration Compliance Validation Initiative (SCCVI) 
SCCVI is comprised of eEye Digital Security’s Retina Network Security Scanner and its Remote 
Enterprise Management (REM) console.  The SCCVI tool is instrumental in downloading 
Information Assurance Vulnerability Management  (IAVM) information, conducting scans to 
identify network assets impacted by the vulnerability, passing information to the Secure 
Configuration Remediation Initiative (SCRI) tool regarding impacted network assets, conducting 
vulnerability mitigation scans, and reporting IAVM compliance status to the DOD Information 
Assurance Vulnerability Management System (VMS) database.   
The scanner can conduct two types of scans.  For systems supported by the capability and for 
which it has administrative permissions, the SCCVI tool conducts an internal scan of the 
system’s configuration and registry files.  SCCVI supports most hardware systems, all operating 
systems and the majority of common software applications. For systems that the tool has not 
been provided administrative rights or the occasional software application not supported by 
SCCVI, the scanner will conduct an external ‘ping’ scan of the system.  By scanning, SCCVI 
discovers assets and identifies known security vulnerabilities on various network platforms and 
technologies including servers, databases, switches, routers, and wireless access points.   
The Remote Enterprise Manager (REM) allows multiple scanners to be managed from one 
centralized location.  It also provides the ability for scanners to report their findings to one 
centralized location.  Reports can be generated based on data collected from all of the scanners 
reporting to the REM. 
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Secure Configuration Remediation Initiative (SCRI)  
SCRI is comprised of Citadel Hercules technology.  The SCRI tool imports information from the 
SCCVI tool (scanners) regarding impacted network assets and conducts remediation operations 
(i.e. software patch installations) to address the vulnerabilities. 
Vulnerability remediation involves implementation of corrective actions to eliminate or mitigate 
identified vulnerabilities.  Remediation actions may include implementation of a new or revised 
policy such as a firewall configuration change, frequent password change, type/character/length 
of password, as well as the installation of “patch” code to address vulnerability via software 
changes.  Patch installation can be a time consuming, knowledge-intensive task and the use of 
automated methods to conduct patch installations greatly reduces the level of effort required to 
correct a given vulnerability.   
The SCRI tool leverages the scanned data provided by SCCVI to apply patches, upgrades, fixes, 
or custom changes to a specific system or group of systems impacted by IAVM information to 
facilitate the automatic vulnerability remediation of devices on a network.  The SCRI tool 
provides a sequence of automatically executable remediation steps known as ‘remedies’ that will 
correct each recognized vulnerability.  Users of the product will download new patches from the
government assigned website.  The SCRI tool provides System Administrators with the ability to 
manage a large-scale vulnerability remediation process in a manner that is both systematic and 
comprehensive. 
The principle components of the SCRI suite include the SCRI server, file download server, SCRI 
administrator, and SCRI clients.  In addition to SCRI components, the system requires the 
Window 2000 Operating System and Microsoft IIS Web Server for reporting via remote server 
access. 
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Hypothesis 
Vulnerability identification, remediation and compliance verification within DOD are currently 
inconsistent and non-integrated.  The Secure Configuration Tool Suite solution should make 
significant grounds in resolving the Department of Defense deficiency with an Enterprise-Wide 
Information Assurance Vulnerability Management System. 
Purpose of Research 
The purpose of this document is to provide a plan for seamless deployment and integration of the 
SCTS tools by my employer into an organization’s architecture.  The deployment process is 
intended for installation of the tools whether they are implemented individually or as a package.  
The deployment process is intended to be a framework that can be modified as necessary for the 
specifics of a particular site.   
The site selected is a major Combatant Command that is leading the way for the development of 
the proof of concept and eventually providing the baseline for concepts of operations as it relates 
to SCTS for all DOD to follow. 
The project has five deployment phases: Initiation, Site Survey, Installation, Post-Installation and 
Sustainment.  For each phase, entry and exit criteria were established. A description of each step 
is provided in Chapter Three.  
Once the suite is installed the command which received the installation will provide the 
necessary feedback to make improvements of use and sustainment of these tools. 
Specifically, the objectives of this feedback are: 
• To provide an operational approach for the employment of SCCVI to facilitate asset 
identification, vulnerability assessment, and compliance reporting, 
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• To provide an operational approach for the employment of SCRI tools to expedite 
patch installation that addresses a software vulnerability, 
• To provide an approach to obtain applicable service component and centrally 
managed program assets’ vulnerability compliance status, 
• To describe aspects of employment, training, and life cycle management associated 
with Secure Configuration Tool Suite employment in support of Information 
Assurance Vulnerability Management (IAVM) Program objectives. 
Limitations / Scope 
This project had a few limitations these limitations are as follows: 
• Product selection for the initiatives were done prior to project being develop 
• Security restrictions limit the amount of information that may be published in this 
paper 
• The scope of the project was to evaluate the deployment process and not evaluate the 
products 
• Unable to verify the software methodology process for development 
Definition of Terms 
Please see appendix D for a list of acronyms and the glossary for definition of terms at the end of 
this document. 
Summary
This chapter provides the background information necessary to understand the importance of the 
project and its purpose.  An overview is given of the two initiatives contained in the Secure 
Configuration Tool Suite (SCTS) and what tools were utilized.  A hypothesis is stated and a 
description of the projects limitation is also provided. 
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Chapter Two 
Overview 
Significant research was conducted prior to beginning this project.  For the most part, the 
vendors provided most of the documentation needed for the technical side of the project. In 
addition, there were several DOD documents that were utilized as tasking orders provided by 
higher authority and used as guidelines for the installation.  These documents are not available 
for public review, but the vendor’s installation manuals, users manual, and operation manual 
have been identified in this document.  If one has access to a .mil network, they will be able to 
review all the governing documents that were used in support of this project. 
In an effort to broaden the author’s mind to other possible solutions the DOD might have used, 
research was conducted on the Internet to evaluate other products.  The evaluation was done 
based on the research material reviewed and not on actual hands on approach. 
Literature Review 
As for DOD’s product selection for this project, curiosity struck the author as to whether there 
were better products out there that might have been utilized.  From the vulnerability scanning 
perspective there are many to choose from.  This author, on three other products, conducted a 
literary review in an effort to see if there were better products that DOD could have chosen from.  
The three products chosen for the author’s review where ISS, NetRecon, and Nessus. 
• ISS Internet Scanner is an application-level vulnerability assessment that started off in '92 
as a tiny Open Source scanner by Christopher Klaus. Now ISS has grown into a billion-
dollar company.  ISS Internet Scanner is pretty good, but is not cheap.  
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• Symantec NetRecon helps secure an organization¹s networks by exposing vulnerabilities 
before intruders can exploit and attack them. By automatically scanning systems and 
services on the network and safely simulating common intrusion or attack scenarios.  
• Nessus, formerly an open source vulnerability assessment tool, is a remote security 
scanner for Linux, BSD, Solaris, and other Unices. It is plug-in-based, has a GTK 
interface, and performs over 1200 remote security checks. It allows for reports to be
generated in HTML, XML, LaTeX, and ASCII text, and suggests solutions for security 
problems. It turned proprietary in late 2005 
A March 2003 Information Security magazine review of five vulnerability assessment tools 
(including the ones I reviewed) was conducted and their final evaluation was similar to mind.  
Without micro- analyzing each product, which would be outside of the realm of this project, I 
believe it is safe to quote Mr. Snyder as saying, “None of the products we looked at excelled in 
all areas.  Almost any might be good for a once-a-year scan of your network.  But as day-to-day 
tools in the real world of corporate security, each had significant weaknesses.” (Snyder)  Snyder 
personally did not find one better than the other, the only issue he mentioned that supported the 
selection of Retina by DOD was that eEye Digital Security’s Retina is a newer product that is 
still maturing, but it is one of the most promising of the products he reviewed.  
It is for this reason that this author believes DOD chose Retina over all others.  Of course, cost 
probably had a lot to do with it, but their flexibility to meet DOD needs and make the necessary 
addition could have been the primary reason for the product selection.   
In addition, when you add the REM Security Management Platform, it enables network security 
managers to: 
• Create an inventory of all assets 
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• Audit the assets and evaluate results of the audit 
• Delegate tasks and, if necessary, remediate against vulnerabilities 
• Generate Reports 
• Perform a risk analysis 
“With the REM Security Management Platform, network security personnel are able to plan, 
audit, assign tasks, remediate, and generate reports from a centralized location.” (eEye REM 
Operation Guide 1) 
Most organizations this author worked for have some form of scanning devices or software for 
their network.  They have some process in place to scan for known network vulnerabilities 
automatically.  However, that is where the automation ends.  Once vulnerability is discovered it 
is normally turned over to the security manager so he/she may prioritize the vulnerabilities for 
the security administrators. This is normally done to provide some form of protection against 
installing possible patches that may bring down the network, but it also means your network is 
vulnerable to the threats discovered until the network is patched. 
In an interview that this author read on the Internet by IT Business Edge’s Security Strategies 
section, they spoke with Dave Ostrowski, Product Marketing Manager, for Internet Security 
Systems Inc. (ISS) in Atlanta, and Scott Johnson, the company’s product manager.  In this 
interview Mr. Johnson put it best when it pertains to automated remediation when he said, “Not 
every customer wants to apply automatic updates, because frankly they’re scared. If you just 
automatically apply something and it goes wrong, you’ve just applied that to your whole 
network.”  (Schwartz)  I believe this holds true anywhere you go. 
However there are a growing number of products out there that claim to do automated 
remediation in some form or shape.  For example,  
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Secure Elements Inc announced that its CLASS 5 Automated Vulnerability Remediation 
(AVR) product is a complete vulnerability management solution that enables IT security 
departments to proactively stop attacks before they start. The solution centralizes all 
aspects of vulnerability management, enabling users to automatically protect assets from
most types of exploits, and to quickly locate, lock down and protect assets that have 
known vulnerabilities or that has rogue processes, unauthorized applications or invalid 
users on board. The CLASS 5 AVR standard modules include asset inventory and 
control, policy and audit management, active compliance and enforcement and 
vulnerability assessment and remediation. (Thomas) 
Microsoft also has their version of patch management, which is known as Software Update 
Services, (SUS), or what is going to be used WSUS after 2006.  This product “provides dynamic 
notification of critical updates to Windows computers as well as automatic distribution of those 
updates to your corporate Windows desktops and servers. For Software Update Services to 
function, only one corporate intranet computer requires access to the public Internet.” 
(Microsoft) 
Finally, the last product this author reviewed is called, Altiris.  The reason this author reviewed 
this product was because the agency this author currently works for actually deployed the 
product on their own network.  Altiris provided everything that Hercules does. 
• Asset Monitoring  
• Client & Mobile  
• Security & Compliance  
• Server & Infrastructure  
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Unfortunately even though the product claims to work on a UNIX environment, most of the 
UNIX administrators at my organization state that it does not work very well, mainly because 
Altirus states, “There may not be proper execution of our installation scripts in the cases where 
shell aliases are used.”  Most of the tactical machines used in a DOD environment are configured 
this way.  While there is a work around, it is a tedious process, especially when one is dealing 
with a large quantity of UNIX boxes of different flavors. 
For this initiative the Hercules product was selected.  “The key features of the Hercules system
include its interoperability with industry scanners and assessment tools, and a fully automated 
Remediation and Policy Enforcement solution. The remedy catalog of over 19,000 tested and 
proven remedies enables you to enforce security policies. The Hercules software is the only 
solution that enables remediation of all five classes of vulnerabilities: Unsecured Accounts, 
Unnecessary Services, Backdoors, Mis-configurations, and Software Defects.”  (Hercules User 
Manual) 
What is Known/Unknown about the Project 
The following information is known about the project: 
• The Department of Defense has mandated the use of these tools   
• The Combatant Command has been identified 
• The product selected has been tested and verified to work as advertise 
• Hardware has already been identified 
• The baseline image for each product has been developed and tested   
The following information is unknown about the project: 
• What methodology was utilized for software development since these are commercial 
off the shelf products 
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• Government process for selecting the products that were utilized for this project.  The 
author was not privy to this information 
Contribution the Project will make to the Field 
It is the author’s opinion that this project will contribute considerably to the development, 
planning, and implementation process of any system being installed in a Department of Defense 
environment.  The steps used in this project, i.e. phases, and all the documentation produced will 
contribute significantly to any other project that might develop at the author’s present location. 
Chapter Three 
Methodology 
In the opinion of the author, the methodology used in this project for software development was 
the Software Engineering Institute’s Capability Maturity Model (SEI CMM).  Unfortunately, the 
author was unable to verify this with the vendor.  Anyone that has ever researched the SEI CMM 
process knows that the tool was originally developed for the purpose of government contractors 
to perform contracted software projects.  While the SEI CMM has five levels of maturity it is the
author’s opinion that the three products utilized in the two initiatives that comprise SCTS, are at 
a level three.  Those standards that are needed to complete level two in the process have been 
established and the process for fine-tuning these standards is still on going.  The five maturity 
levels of SEI CMM are as follows: 
1. Initial 
2. Repeatable 
3. Defined 
4. Managed 
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5. Optimizing 
While this methodology focuses on software development, the System Development Life 
Cycle (SDLC) was modified to accommodate the Department of Defense’s way of doing 
business.  The project was comprised of five phases: Initiation, Site Survey, Installation, Post-
Installation, and Sustainment.  The table below illustrates the comparison with the SDLC. 
SDLC Comparison 
Project SDLC 
Phase 1 Initiation Planning Phase 
Phase 2 Site Survey Analysis Phase        
Design Phase 
Phase 3 Installation Implementation Phase 
Phase 4 Post Installation       
Phase 5 Sustainment 
Support Phase 
Table 1 SDLC Comparison with Project Phases 
Specific Procedures 
The methodology selected worked according to plan.  Specifically, for each phase, entry and exit 
criteria were established.  These criteria’s are discussed in the next chapter. 
Initiation Phase 
The Initiation phase consisted of the initial contact with the site representatives, delivery of the 
implementation package, a pre-coordination meeting to walk through the Coordination Package, 
and the site submission of the completed site survey form.  During this phase, each site provided 
sufficient information to make decisions regarding the use of the SCTS tools.   
Site Survey Phase 
The Site Survey phase consisted of the Site Survey meeting, hardware configuration, and 
delivery and training.  The purpose of this phase was to address technical aspects of the 
implementation, facility readiness, the technical solution, and the schedule.   
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Installation Phase 
The installation phase consisted of the Kick-Off meeting, installation of hardware and software, 
confirmation of the configuration, system familiarization, and the Out-Brief.   
Post-Installation Phase 
The Post-Installation phase consisted of final coordination of the Memorandum of Agreement
(MOA), documentation of the lessons learned, the start of the customer feedback cycle, and 
initiation of life-cycle support.   
Sustainment Phase 
The Sustainment phase consisted of life-cycle support and feedback.  Since this was the final 
phase there really were no exit criteria.  It is an ongoing phase until the end of the life cycle of 
the product, which has not been determined. 
Deliverables 
The deliverables for this project was as follows: 
• Provide hardware and software necessary for the installation of the suite in accordance 
with the System Security Authorization Agreement (SSAA). 
• Install a fully functional SCTS and test that functionally based on MOA. 
• Provide over the shoulder training to qualified administrators on site. 
Resource Requirements 
The following resources were required for the project: 
• Installation Team
• Hardware 
• Software plus Licenses 
• Administrative Documentation. 
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• Network Connectivity 
• The following ports need to be open based on product requirements 
9 Retina - For scanning Windows boxes UDP ports 135, 137 and TCP ports 139 
and 445 need to be open.  For scanning a UNIX system, TCP port 22 should be 
open. 
9 REM – Outbound TCP Port 21690 for Retina to REM communication and TCP 
Port 21692 for REM-to-REM communications. 
9 Hercules – Outbound TCP port 80 for communications with the download server.  
Hercules also needs UDP ports 135 and 137 open as well as TCP 139 and 445 to 
remediate Windows boxes and TCP port 22 open to > remediate UNIX systems. 
• Trained System Administrator that has administrator rights on local network prior to 
installation.
Outcome 
While there were hiccups during the installation, all phases were completed as planned. All of 
the findings were documented in the next chapter.  The methodology used was perfect for this 
project.  A lot was learned that lent to future installations. 
Summary
This chapter’s main focus was to provide the background of the research method used in support 
of the project.  It also provided a very brief comparison of the phases used in the project and how 
those relate to the System Development Life Cycle.  The specific procedure required to proceed 
with the project was introduced and deliverables and resource requirements were identified.  
Finally, the outcome of the project was stated. 
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Chapter 4 
Project History 
This project started late September of 2005 and pretty much was completed late November 2005.  
Each phase was executed according to plan and all exit criteria met with the exceptions of those 
noted in this paper.  Team members where assigned their install locations during Phase Two of 
the project.  Upon conclusion of the project all that was desired was obtained.  
How the project was managed 
As stated before the project was managed by strict adherence to the phases developed for 
execution.  Below are tables which define the entry and exit criteria of each phase. 
Phase One: 
Entry Criteria Exit Criteria 
Signed ATO Established Communication with On-site Rep 
Tool Release Announcement to the Enterprise Established Communication with Site POC
Up-to-date Coordination Package Completed Coordination Meeting 
Completed Site Survey Form 
Scheduled Site Survey Meeting  
Table 2 Initiation Phase: Entry and Exit Criteria 
Phase Two: 
Entry Criteria Exit Criteria 
Established Communication with On-site Rep Trained Staff 
Established Communication with Site POC Defined Technical Solution
Completed Coordination Meeting Coordinated Installation Schedule Milestones
Completed Site Survey Form Closed Critical Action Items 
Scheduled Site Survey Meeting In-Processed Hardware at Site
Table 3  Site Survey Phase: Entry and Exit Criteria 
Phase Three: 
Entry Criteria Exit Criteria 
Trained Staff  Installed Technical Solution 
Defined Technical Solution Completed Familiarization
Coordinated Installation Schedule Milestones Signed Property Transfer (1149)
Closed Critical Action Items Completed Out-Brief  
In-processed Hardware Documented Status 
Table 4  Installation Phase: Entry and Exit Criteria 
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Phase Four:
Entry Criteria Exit Criteria 
Installed Technical Solution Initiated Life-Cycle Support 
Completed Familiarization Quality Controlled
Signed Property Transfer Documented Lessons Learned
Completed Out-Brief  Finalized Memorandum of Agreement 
Documented Status 
Table 5  Post Installation Phase:  Entry and Exit Criteria
Phase Five: 
Entry Criteria Exit Criteria 
Initiated Life Cycle Support 
Quality Controlled
Documented Lessons Learned
Finalized Memorandum of Agreement 
Table 6  Sustainment Phase:  Entry and Exit Criteria 
Changes to project
As the tools were installed at the sub-component sites there was a transition into what would be 
defined as the implantation, which was when the site began to utilize the tools and started to 
implement the processes which should have eventually ended up with the report of their asset 
status being relayed up to the REM Server at the Combatant Command.  Unfortunately, this did 
not happen for the reasons mentioned above. 
These processes should have consisted of a completed Retina scan with at a minimum the DOD 
IAVA policy, against 100% of each site’s assets, followed by a remediation to the extent that the 
operational sub-component would have allowed.  Once the remediation was completed, there 
should have been a 100% rescan of the network using the same policy and the results would have 
then been reported up to the REM Server at the Combatant Command.  This, of course, did not 
happen either.  However, if all the sub-components completed their respected network scans and 
reported this to the Combatant Command’s REM Server, this would have ultimately given a 
complete picture of the security posture of that Combatant Command and its sub-components.  
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This was anticipated during this installation.  Appendix C shows a simulation of how the SCTS 
was installed at this Combatant Command and it sub-components.  
Where goals meet 
The Secure Configuration Tool Suite solution will make significant grounds in resolving the 
DOD’s deficiency with an Enterprise-wide Information Assurance Vulnerability Management 
System, the products proved themselves in the field during this project and the baseline 
implementation plan was effective.  
The two goals established for this project were reached, 
1. Develop a plan for seamless deployment and integration to be used as the baseline for 
future installations at other DoD components  
2.  Develop a concept of operation for reporting within these components
However, a consensus needs to be established for the concept of operations on reporting. 
Findings
It was evident to this author that a better job could have been performed in preparation of this 
installment.  While all steps were taken to follow each phase prior to proceeding to the next, a lot 
of issues where taken for granted.  Some of the technical issues discovered during the installation 
were as follows: 
• Ports 21690 and 21692 were not open prior to arriving costing a delay of four 
hours 
• Access to the DOD designated download server for Hercules was not 
permitted from within the command   
• Site Responsibility agreements prior to installation team arrival were not 
adhered to, thus delaying software installation 
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• None of the System Administrators remembered prior training 
• Command would not allow my company’s baseline scanner on their network 
• Command did not trust automated remediation  
• One sub-component command had received a damaged server, unable to 
install Hercules
• One sub-component did not even know we were coming and canceled the 
installation until Phase 1 and 2 where complete at their site
• Numerous firewall issues amongst the combatant command and its 
subcomponents.  Lack of communication hindered the installation
Unfortunately it was not the technical issues that presented the biggest challenges in this project.  
The biggest challenges presented were the bureaucratic red tape that were addressed and ignored.  
Whether a military installation or a commercial business, change is a hard thing to accept.  This 
project introduced changes in reporting network vulnerability status which created an 
atmosphere of fear on who would see what.  In addition the idea to automate the remediation 
process was not accepted very well, most of the administrators where reluctant to allow an 
automated product to do the patching of vulnerabilities on workstations, but most importantly on 
their servers themselves.
Summary of Results 
The Combatant Command that was selected had a very complex network, making it difficult to 
work with both local and sub-component networks.  Firewalls/routers were supposed to be open 
to sub-component sites prior to the arrival of the installation teams, however they were not.  Sub-
components sent the necessary waiver forms, requesting the Combatant Command’s firewalls to 
be opened for their scanners, but the forms had to be resubmitted multiple times due to errors 
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such as incorrect ports and IP’s.  In addition, it did not help that Firewalls were going thru 
scheduled maintenance, so they were up and down throughout this installation. 
All this could have been avoided had the Combatant Command followed through with all 
agreements made during the first three phases of this project. 
It was evident to this author that all key players needed to be involved throughout the whole 
process and not just entering the picture during Phase Three.  The resistance to change and all the 
technical issues that surfaced could have been avoided if everyone was involved from the 
beginning. 
From an installer’s point of view the project installation was a success.  All suites were installed 
at their respected site and within each site everything worked as advertised.  Unfortunately, the 
internal operational objectives or commitments set the project up for failure and the initial goal 
of providing an Enterprise reporting and remediation tool was not achieved at the enterprise 
level.  At the local level administrators tested the products and while there was a reluctancy to 
commit to the product it was evident to this author that there was overwhelming interest to utilize 
the product once the product gained their trust. 
A lot was learned from this project and have since been applied on subsequent installations.  
While the Combatant Command is still working out their reporting policy with each of the sub-
components, the sub-components are using the products at their respected site.  Feedback 
received on issues that are relevant and benefit all have been applied based on these feedback 
reports. 
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Chapter 5 
What was learned 
So much was learned during this project.  To try to document everything in the author’s opinion 
is impossible.  However, below is a breakdown of issues that were encountered during the 
process.  It has been broken into two categories: Technical and Non-Technical.  One must keep 
in mind that some of the technical issues are specific to DOD configuration of any system and 
may not apply to a commercial entity.   
Technical:
• The Rename Script provided by my employer does not need to be run when changing 
the Hercules Server IP address, only when changing the NETBIOS name.  
• Hercules will not remediate GLOBAL POLICY in an Active Directory network.  It 
will change LOCAL POLICY on a system, but this will not affect the entire domain. 
• Place the Hercules Server outside the domain if possible.  This eliminates any 
possible DOMAIN SECURITY POLICY problems such as removing user 
permissions from the Hercules box. 
• Hercules client names should be less than fifteen characters. 
• When scanning an active directory network it was determined that if certain options 
were enabled within the scanner, Retina will lockout accounts. The settings have been 
narrowed down to: Enumerating Users via NetBIOS and the three password checks. 
The only check that is enabled by default in the IAVA audit is the Enumerating Users 
via NetBIOS (under options).  If one is scanning an active directory network you will 
want to turn these options off.  
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• Retina/REM Permission issues - IUSR accounts need the following permissions at a 
minimum in order for REM to function correctly:  
 REM Events Manager\ -- Modify  
 REM Events Manager\*.xml -- Modify  
 REM Events Manager\*.dll -- Read  
 REM Events Manager\HTML\ -- Read (recursive)  
 REM Events Manager\HTML\Reports -- Modify (recursive)  
 REM Events Manager\HTML\export -- Modify (recursive)  
 REM Events Manager\JobQueues\ -- Modify (recursive)  
 REM Events Manager\Templates -- Read (recursive)  
 Retina5\retinaconfig.xml -- Read + Write  
 Retina5\Groups -- Modify (recursive)  
 Retina 5\Scans\Jobs\REM -- Read + Write (recursive)
Non-Technical: 
• Bring our own rack hardware toolkit (ex. Screwdriver, etc.). 
• Ensure everyone is involved in the process starting from Phase 1. 
• Contact actual administrators to get a realistic confirmation of the site survey and 
validate its content. 
• Ensure a government representative from this author’s agency is present or available 
on request. 
What would have been done differently
From the author’s perspective the biggest thing that would be done differently for this project 
occurs in Phase Four, finalizing the Memorandum of Agreement.  It is the author’s belief that
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much of the political rhetoric described in this paper could have been resolved if this document 
was finalized during Phase Two and established as an exit criteria for that phase. 
Possible Future Work 
The SCTS is gaining momentum since the end of this installation.  A new version has hit the 
street and testing has been completed.  All future installations will be based on a 2003 platform
with XP scanners.  Everything learned from this installation have been incorporated into future 
installs in an effort not to repeat the same mistakes. 
The initial problems presented during this project have long since been forgotten.  The team and 
the author continue to march forward with more installations throughout DOD.  The new tasking 
order that mandated the item be implemented by 2008 has done a lot for eliminating the political 
rhetoric that we had to endure. 
We are receiving more requests for the installations of these products daily.  Since the end of this 
project, this author has personally installed ten suites at ten different locations on my own, which 
is not to mention what the other nine members of the team have done. 
Customers are starting to learn the value of what the Secure Configuration Tool Suite has to offer 
to their network as it relates to Information Assurance, bringing DOD one step closer to the 
ultimate IA tool suite. 
Conclusions / recommendations 
A lot of preparation and man-hours where dedicated to the completion of this project.  It is this 
author’s opinion that the Secure Configuration Tool Suite solution will make significant grounds 
in resolving the DOD’s deficiency with an Enterprise-wide Information Assurance Vulnerability 
Management System. 
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These products proved themselves in the field and while everything did not go exactly according
to plans, the project, in this author’s opinion, was a success.  As a former Information System’s 
Officer in the United States Navy, this author would have done back flips if these products were 
available.  The ability to scan a network for compliancy and then remediate your deficiencies at a 
click of a button is worth the changes one has to make in their environment.  
As more systems are deployed so does the interest in the products and the initiative.  This author
looks forward to seeing this initiative go full circle.   
Summary
For the last few years the Department of Defense has been advertising the Secure Configuration 
Tool Suite as the tool that will assist in the resolution of vulnerability identification, remediation, 
and compliance verification in a consistent and integrated manner within the Department of 
Defense.   
The project documented in this paper was an effort to develop a baseline for deployment to be 
utilized in future installations.  In addition, a proof of concept on reporting these vulnerabilities 
and compliancy was also being developed.  The project succeeded in both efforts in the opinion 
of the author; although, some may interpret some of the writings in this paper to indicate other 
wise.   
This paper should be useful as a guideline for installing the two products anywhere.  The 
network diagram in Appendix C should give anyone an idea how these three systems interface.  
The site surveys can be tailored to anyone’s needs. 
The whole process, to include writing and briefing this paper has resulted in such a wealth of
knowledge that is impossible to measure.  The author sincerely hopes that the readers of this 
document will benefit as well. 
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Appendix A – SCCVI Site Survey checklist 
SCCVI Site Survey 
Site Security Information 
Site Location 
Dates On-Site: 
Assigned Tech(s) 
Security Clearance POC: 
 Phone Number: 
 Fax Number: 
 E-mail address: 
Security Clearance(s) Sent: Yes No 
Initial Site Contact Information 
POC Name: 
 Phone Number 
 Email Address: 
Networking Personnel: 
 Phone Number 
 Email Address: 
Operations Personnel: 
 Phone Number 
 Email Address: 
System Configuration Information 
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REM: 
System Name 
(NetBIOS): 
 System IP: 
Documentation 
MOA: 
SSAA: 
Checklist 
Can XXX get an approved server name and IP address before install?  (if yes 
list information in System Configuration Information area on page 1) 
Yes  No
Can you get a copy of a network diagram and any network information 
beforehand? 
Yes  No
Base Network Topology Diagrams – IP address space included Yes  No
Will SCCVI equipment be interfaced with a proxy? Yes  No
Does the network administrator have access to modify the Firewall? Yes  No
Ports: 21690, 21692, 80 or 443 have been opened for SCCVI operation Yes  No
What is the CCB process to get equipment on network (list on last sheet) Yes  No
Does local policy allow for server service to be running? Yes  No
Is Server Service currently running on all network systems? (Needed for 
Retina) 
Yes  No
Does local policy allow for remote registry access? (Needed for Retina) Yes  No
Is remote registry access currently enabled on all network systems? Yes  No
Will the Windows devices have the three default administration shares (C$, 
IPC$, ADMIN$) turned on? 
Yes  No
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Bandwidth limitations if any (3KB – 11 KB needed) Yes  No
Do we have approval to connect to the network? Yes  No
What is the network speed (10/100, Gig)? Yes  No
Rack requirements is 1U for REM; Retina is a laptop 
Is space available? Yes  No
Square or round holes for mounting? S  R 
Width and depth of racks?  Need specs 
Are shelves available if racks are incompatible
Power requirements met 
Note: Systems will not be deployed with a monitor, keyboard or mouse  
DAA to approve connection Yes  No
Who needs to be notified for approval to install new software and hardware 
onto the network? 
Are the SA’s certified through DISA (either on-line or classroom) for 
REM/Retina? 
Yes  No
Are there are “work time constraints” – e.g. No overtime allowed, XXX team 
must report to work at certain time, or leave by certain time, etc?  If so, list 
below.  This could impact number of days XXX team needs to complete install. 
Yes  No
Shipping Information 
PBO Name (Site): 
PBO Telephone Number: 
PBO e-mail Address: 
Site Mailing Address:  
Mark For (POC name): 
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POC Telephone Number: 
Completed Shipping Checklist: Yes No 
Date Shipped: 
Date of Clone used: 
(to verify IAVAs/Patches/AV dates)
FedEx Tracking Number (s) 
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Appendix B – SCRI Site Survey checklist  
SCRI Site Survey 
Site Security Information 
Site Location 
Dates On-Site: 
Assigned Tech(s) 
Security Clearance POC: 
 Phone Number: 
 Fax Number: 
 E-mail address: 
Security Clearance(s) Sent: Yes No 
Initial Site Contact Information 
POC Name: 
 Phone Number 
 Email Address: 
Backup POC Name: 
 Phone Number 
 Email Address: 
Networking Personnel: 
 Phone Number 
 Email Address: 
Operations Personnel: 
 Phone Number 
 Email Address: 
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Documentation 
MOA: 
SSAA: 
Checklist 
Can XXX get a copy of a network diagram and any network information 
beforehand? 
Can XXX get an approved server name and IP address before install?  (if yes 
list information on last sheet) 
Does the network administrator have access to modify the Firewall and or 
local routers? 
What is the CCB process to get equipment on network (list on last sheet)? 
Does local policy allow for agents to be used on systems? 
Does local policy allow for server service to be running? 
Is Server Service currently running on all Windows network systems? 
Does local policy allow for remote registry access? 
Is remote registry access currently enabled on all network systems? 
Can site supply a workstation for Hercules Admin console to be installed on? 
(this is the management software for the Hercules server – see specs below)
Will your Unix clients have SSH 3.5p1 or greater installed?
Are there HTTP, HTTPS or FTP proxies between the Hercules server and the 
Download server in Montgomery? 
Will Hercules be able to utilize Windows administrator accounts that have 
access to remote Windows devices that remote installation of the Hercules 
client is required? 
Will the Windows devices have the three default administration shares (C$, 
IPC$, ADMIN$) turned on? 
 
                                                                                                                DOD’s SCTS Initiative 43  
Will the Windows devices allow remote registry access? 
Will Hercules be allowed to create a Windows domain administration account 
for remote installation and administration of the Hercules client? 
Are all the sites under a single domain? 
Have you reviewed the Windows client device minimum requirements and do 
yours meet them? 
Have you reviewed the Unix client device minimum requirements and do 
yours meet them? 
Is the SSH TCP/IP port 22 enabled in your network to allow remote 
installation and administration of the Unix Hercules client? 
Are there Windows desktop firewalls in place and if so, will it prohibit 
outbound HTTP/HTTPS access by the Hercules clients? 
Bandwidth limitations, if any? (explain below)
Will site be able to obtain a SSL Certificate (if needed) from DOD for 
Hercules server? 
Do we have approval to connect to the network? 
What is the network speed (10/100, Gig)? 
Rack requirements (Hercules server is 2U – Combo REM/Hercules is 3U) 
Is space available? 
Square or round holes for mounting? 
Width and depth of racks?  Need specs 
Are shelves available if racks are incompatible
Power requirements met? (dual power supplies) 
DAA to approve connection? 
Who needs to be notified for approval to install new software and hardware 
onto the network? 
Are there are “work time constraints” – e.g. No overtime allowed, XXX team 
must report to work at certain time, or leave by certain time, etc?  If so, list 
below.  This could impact number of days XXX team needs to complete install. 
Yes  No
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System Count and requirements 
Please list the estimated amount of each type of OS that the client software will be installed on. 
Windows NT 4 Workstations  _____________ 
Windows NT 4 Terminal Servers  _____________ 
Windows NT 4 Server _____________ 
Windows 2000   _____________ 
Windows XP    _____________ 
Windows 2003   _____________ 
Sun Solaris    _____________ 
Red Hat Linux   _____________ 
IBM AIX    _____________ 
HP HP-UX    _____________ 
Apple Mac OS X _____________ 
The Hercules Server must meet the following requirements (if you installing your own): 
Type Hercules Server Components Comments
Operating 
Systems 
Windows® 2000 Server, SP4 
Windows® 2000 Advanced Server, 
SP4 
Windows Server™ 2003 Standard 
Edition 
Windows Server™ 2003 Enterprise 
Edition 
• The Hercules Server can be 
installed on top of an existing MSDE 
or SQL Server 2000 installation. 
• The Hercules Server cannot be 
installed on a machine that is either a 
Primary (PDC) or Backup Domain 
Controller (BDC) or Active Directory 
Controller (ADC). 
• SSL is used for secure 
communication. 
• Software, IIS and Web Browser 
must be installed prior to installing 
the Hercules Server. 
Processor Pentium® 4, 2 GHz or above 
Memory 512 MB RAM or above 
Free Disk Space 2.8 GB for server installation 
5.0 GB for server upgrade 
VGA Graphics 1024x768 resolution 
Network Interface 100 Mb/s 
Web Browser Internet Explorer® 6.0 SP1 
Web Server IIS 5.0 (Windows® 2000 Server 
family) 
™
Software Microsoft®.NET Framework v1.1 
Microsoft® ASP.NET for Windows 
Server 2003 
Adobe Acrobat Reader™ 6.02 or 
higher 
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The following are requirements for running the Hercules Administrator Console: 
Type Hercules Administrator 
Components 
Comments 
Operating 
Systems 
Windows 2000 Server, SP4 
Windows 2000 Advanced Server, SP4
Windows® 2000 Professional, SP4 
Windows® XP Professional, all SP 
Windows Server 2003 Standard 
Edition 
Windows Server 2003 Enterprise 
Edition 
 • The Hercules Administrator can run
on the same machine as the Hercules 
Server, but additional disk space and 
memory will be needed.
 • The user of the Hercules 
Administrator must be using either a 
valid local Microsoft Windows 
account on the Hercules Server or a 
domain account recognized by the 
Hercules Server. 
Processor Pentium III, 750 MHz or above 
Memory 256 MB RAM or above 
Free Disk Space 1 GB or above 
VGA Graphics 1024x768 resolution 
Network Interface 100 Mb/s 
Web Browser Internet Explorer 5.5 or above 
Software Microsoft .NET Framework v1.1 
Adobe Acrobat Reader 6.02 or higher 
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Hercules Windows Client Requirements:
Type Components for Hercules Client for 
Microsoft Windows 
Comments 
Operating 
Systems 
Windows 2000 Server, all Service Packs 
(SP) 
Windows 2000 Advanced Server, all SP
Windows 2000 Professional, all SP 
Windows NT® 4.0 Workstation, SP6 
Windows NT® 4.0 Standard Server, 
SP6 
Windows NT® 4.0 Terminal Server, 
SP6 
Windows XP Professional, all SP 
Windows Server 2003 Standard Edition
Windows Server 2003 Enterprise 
Edition 
Windows Server™ 2003 Small Business 
Edition 
Windows Server™ 2003 Web Edition
 • Disk space for patch downloads 
depends on size of patches, service 
packs, and hot fixes. 
 • For services that must be running 
prior to  installation, see Hercules 
User’s Guide. 
Processor Pentium II or above 
Memory 64 MB RAM or above 
Free Disk Space 15 MB for client installation 
5 GB for patch downloads 
Web Browser Internet Explorer 5.5 SP2 or above, only 
to support Windows NT 4.0 platforms 
Security SSL used for secure communications
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Hercules Solaris Client Requirements: 
Type Solaris Components Comments
Operating 
Systems 
Solaris™ 2.6, 7, 8, 9 • Hercules Client operates at run 
level 3 
• Outbound access via 
HTTP/HTTPS 
• (SSH) Inbound root access via 
TCP/IP port 22 
• Patch clusters recommended for 
downloads 
• Disk space for patch download 
depends on size of patches and 
packages to download. 
• Install gzip and unzip in /bin or 
/usr/local/bin so client can unzip 
Solaris packages. 
• Citadel recommends sudo access 
for enhanced security. 
Processor SPARC® 
Memory 64 MB RAM or above 
Free Disk Space 15 MB in /opt for client install and msg 
logging 
200 MB for patch download to 
/opt/citadel/hercules/download 
Software (Solaris 2.6 only) gzip for 
2. 6_Recommended. tar. Z files 
Security Software • OpenSSH v3.5p1 or higher 
• SSL/HTTPS enabled with OpenSSL 
0.96 or higher 
• (Solaris 8 only) requires patch 
112438-01 to enable SSL and SSH 
• Sudo v1.6.7 or later (optional) 
a. If you are running Solaris 2.6, and want to remediate a vulnerability that requires the 
2. 6_Recommended. tar . Zfile downloaded from sunsolve. sun. com and installed on the server, you 
must first have the gz ip package installed. It does not come installed by default in this older 
version of Solaris. Solaris 7, 8, and 9 do not have this issue. 
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Hercules Red Hat Client Requirements: 
Type Red Hat Components Comments 
Operating 
Systems 
Red Hat 6.0, 6.1, 6.2, 7.0, 7.1,7.2, 7.3, 
8, 9 
• Hercules Client operates at run 
level 3 
• Outbound access via 
HTTP/HTTPS 
• Disk space for patch downloads 
depends on size of RPMs to 
download. 
Processor Pentium II class 
Memory 64 MB RAM or above 
Free Disk Space 15 MB in /opt for client install and msg 
logging 
200 MB for patch downloads to 
/opt/citadel/hercules/down load 
Software Minimum RPM package versions 
required: 
• bzip2-0.9.5d-2.i386.rpm
• db3-3.1a
• popt-1.5-9.6x.i386.rpm
• rpm-4.0.2-6x.i386.rpm
• If these packages are not installed, 
you will need to install them (in the 
order listed). 
• Red Hat 7.3 should already include 
the bzip and popt packages. 
Security 
Software 
• OpenSSH v3.5p1 or higher 
• SSL/HTTPS enabled with 
OpenSSL 0.9.6 
or higher 
• Sudo v1.6.7 or later (optional) 
• (SSH) Inbound root access via 
TCP/IP port 22 
• Citadel recommends sudo access 
for enhanced security. By default, 
sudo is installed with Red Hat v8 and 
v9. 
a. For Red Hat 6.0 and 6.1, use db3~3.1.17~4.6xi.386.rpm instead. In Hercules 2.2.0, Citadel 
stopped providing new remedies for Red Hat Linux 6.0 and 6.1 because these versions are no 
longer supported by Red Hat. 
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Hercules AIX Client Requirements: 
Type AIX Components Comments 
Platforms AIX 5.1, 5.2 • Hercules Client operates at run level 
2 
• Outbound access via HTTP/HTTPS 
• Disk space for patch downloads 
depends on size of bff or .tar.gz files to 
download. 
Processor PowerPC™
Memory 128 MB RAM or above 
Free Disk Space 15 MB in /opt for client install 
2 GB for patch downloads in 
/opt/citadel/hercules/down load 
Security 
Software 
• OpenSSH v3.5p1 or higher 
• SSL/HTTPS enabled with 
OpenSSL 
0.9.6 or higher 
• Sudo v1.6.7 or later (optional) 
• (SSH) Inbound root access via 
TCP/IP port 22 
• Citadel recommends sudo access for 
enhanced security 
Hercules HP-UX Client Requirements: 
Type HP-UX Component Comments 
Platforms HP-UX 11.0, 11 iv1 • Hercules Client operates at run level 3 
• Outbound access via HTTP/HTTPS 
• Disk space for patch downloads 
depends on size of the depot files to 
download. 
Processor PA-RISC™
Memory 128 MB RAM or above 
Free Disk Space 15 MB in /opt for client install 
1 GB for patch download in 
/opt/citadel/hercules/down load 
Software Requires the following or 
superseding 
patches: 
PHSS_28869 (for HP-UX 11.0) 
PHSS_28871 (for HP-UX 11 iv1)
•"Download latest patches for HP-
UX 11.0 and 11iv1"  
Security 
Software 
• OpenSSH v3.5p1 or higher 
• SSL/HTTPS enabled with 
OpenSSL 
0.9.6 or higher 
• Sudo v1.6.7 or later (optional) 
• (SSH) Inbound root access via TCP/IP 
port 22 
• Citadel recommends sudo access for 
enhanced security 
 
                                                                                                                DOD’s SCTS Initiative 50  
Hercules OS X Client Requirements: 
Type Mac OS X Component Comments 
Platforms Mac OS X 10.2 (Jaguar) • Hercules Client runs as a daemon 
• Outbound access via HTTP/HTTPS 
• Disk space for patch downloads 
depends on size of the disk image (dmg) 
files to download. 
Processor PowerPC™
Memory 128 MB RAM or above 
Free Disk Space 15 MB in /opt for client install 
200 MB for patch download in 
/opt/citadel/hercules/down load 
Security 
Software 
• OpenSSH v3.6.1 p1 or higher 
• SSL/HTTPS enabled with 
OpenSSL 0.9.6 or higher 
• Sudo v1.6.7 or later (optional)
• (SSH) Inbound root access via TCP/IP 
port 22. 
• Citadel recommends sudo access for 
enhanced security. By default, sudo is 
installed with the Mac OS X. 
a. This version is different than that required for the other clients. 
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Shipping Information 
PBO Name (Site): 
PBO Telephone Number: 
PBO e-mail Address: 
Site Mailing Address:  
Mark For (POC name): 
POC Telephone Number: 
Completed Shipping Checklist: Yes No 
Date Shipped: 
Date of Clone used: 
FedEx Tracking Number (s) 
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Additional Information 
Site-specific
information and/or 
comments.
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Appendix C – Network Diagram of Installation  
Figure 1  Network Diagram of Installation 
The network diagram above is not an actual site-specific drawing.  This is just a representation of 
the design used due to security concerns of actually publishing a combatant command’s network 
diagram on the Internet. The number of site represented in the diagram does not reflect the actual 
number of sites the SCTS was installed at for this project. 
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Appendix D – Acronym Listing 
ATO – Authority to Operate 
AVR - Automated Vulnerability Remediation 
CM - Configuration Management 
CMM - Capability Maturity Model 
CND – Computer Network Defense 
COCOMS - Combatant Commands 
CONOPS - Concept of Operations 
DOD – Department of Defense 
ESSG – Enterprise Solutions Steering Group 
HTTP - HyperText Transfer Protocol  
HTTPS - HyperText Transfer Protocol (Secure) 
IA – Information Assurance 
IAVM - Information Assurance Vulnerability Management 
IDS - Intrusion Detection System
IIS – Internet Information Services 
IP - Internet Protocol 
IS - Information System
IT - Information Technology 
LAN -  Local Area Network 
MOA - Memorandum of Agreement 
MOU - Memorandum of Understanding 
POC - Point of Contact 
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REM - Remote Enterprise Management  
SA - System Administrator 
SCCVI – Secure Configuration Compliance Validation Initiative 
SCRI – Secure Configuration Remediation Initiative 
SCTS - Secure Configuration Tool Suite 
SEI - Software Engineering Institute
SMS - Systems Management Server 
SSAA – System Security Authorization Agreement 
TCP/IP - Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol 
VA – Vulnerability Assessment 
VMS - Vulnerability Management System
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Glossary of Terms 
Accountability - The property that allows the ability to identify, verifies, and traces system
entities as well as changes in status.  Accountability is considered to include authenticity and 
non-repudiation. 
Accreditation - The formal declaration by an Accreditor that an AIS, site, application, or network 
is approved to operate in a particular security mode using a prescribed set of safeguards. 
Architecture - The configuration of any equipment or interconnected system or subsystems of 
equipment that is used in the automatic acquisition, storage, manipulation, management, 
movement, control, display, switching, interchange, transmission, or reception of data or 
information; includes computers, ancillary equipment, and services, including support services 
and related resources. 
Assurance - A measure of confidence that the security features and architecture of an AIS, site, 
application, or network accurately mediate and enforce security policies and is composed of the 
degree of availability, confidentiality, accountability, and integrity required of the AIS, site, 
application, or network. 
Configuration Control - Process of controlling modifications to an IT system’s hardware, 
firmware, software, and documentation to ensure that the system is protected against improper 
modifications prior to, during, and after system implementation. 
Configuration Management (CM) - Management of security features and assurances through 
control of changes made to hardware, firmware, software, documentation, test, test fixtures, and 
test documentation of an automated information system throughout the development and 
operational life of a system. 
Designated Approving Authority (DAA) - Official with authority to formally assume 
responsibility for operating an AIS, site, application, or network at an acceptable level of risk. 
Developer - The organization or individual that develops the information system or application. 
Environment - The aggregate of external procedures, conditions, and objects that affect the 
development, operation, and maintenance of a system. 
Information Security Policy - The aggregate of directives, regulations, rules, and practices that 
regulate how an organization manages, protects, and distributes information.  For example, the 
information security policy for financial data processed on DOD systems can be contained in 
public law, executive orders, DOD directives and local regulations.  The information security 
policy lists all the security requirements applicable to specific information. 
Information System (IS) - Any telecommunication or computer-related equipment or 
interconnected system or subsystems of equipment that is used in the acquisition, storage, 
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manipulation, management, movement, control, display, switching, interchange, transmission, or 
reception of voice and/or data, and includes software, firmware, and hardware.  
Information Technology (IT) - The hardware, firmware, and software used to perform DOD 
information functions.  This definition includes computers, telecommunications, automated 
information systems, and automatic data processing equipment.  IT includes any assembly of 
computer hardware, software, and/or firmware configured to collect, create, communicate, 
compute, disseminate, process, store, and/or control data or information. 
Information Technology Security (ITSEC) - Protection and maintenance of confidentiality, 
integrity, availability, and accountability. 
Risk Assessment - Process of analyzing threats to and vulnerabilities of an IT system, and the 
potential impact that the loss of information or capabilities of a system would have on national 
security and using the analysis as a basis for identifying appropriate and cost-effective 
countermeasures. 
Risk Management - Process concerned with the identification, measurement, control, and 
minimization of security risks in IT systems.   
Security - Measures and controls that ensure confidentiality, integrity, availability, and
accountability of the information processed and stored by a computer. 
Security Policy - The set of laws, rules, and practices that regulate how sensitive or critical
information is managed, protected, distributed, and stored. 
Security Requirements - Types and levels of protection necessary for equipment, data, 
information, applications, and facilities to meet security policy. 
Threat - The capabilities, intentions, and attack methods of adversaries to exploit, or any 
circumstance or event with the potential to cause harm to information or an AIS, site, 
application, or network. 
Validation - Determination of the correct implementation in the completed IT system with the 
security requirements and approach agreed upon by the users, acquisition authority, and DAA. 
Verification - The process of determining compliance of the evolving or existing IT system
specification, design, or code with the security requirements and approach agreed on by the 
users, acquisition authority, and DAA. 
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Retina. User Manual. (2004) Retina Network Security Scanner rev 5-51. eEye Digital Security.  
Aliso Viejo, California. 
 
                                                                                                                DOD’s SCTS Initiative 59  
This manual is intended for network security administrators who are responsible for 
using Retina.  The install team to provide the required over the shoulder training used 
this guide. 
Hercules ver. 3.51.  (2005).  User Guide Hercules ver. 1.  Citadel Security Software Inc. Dallas, 
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policies listed above are adhered to.  One can look up these policies if they have access to a .mil 
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